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Phil Croucher

Confined Areas

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Your correct when you say ¨YOU LEAVES NOTHING IN THE BANK!¨but read all post

 

No one say it is a ¨Tout les jours!¨ normal operation! but it can be helpfull to do it and if you do it do it right! IT CAN SAVE YOUR ***!!!!

 

That's what B.M.....k say in 82 in YFC when i was doing my training he show me the DO and DON'T in different situation and it is why i can still write this post today!

 

By the way BM you description of the procedure is so true i'm still hearing Brian discribe in the intercom it many moon ago!

 

Best time of my life!

 

Guy

Oh! i forget to add

 

Ha!Ha! you say that you always turn left (i suppose conterclock rotor) you +- doing the unloaded tail rotor procedure using less power! but never realise it!you use it since the forward speed is pushing the tail to the right and you driving yourself via the rotor to the left!it is all in the finess of the mouvement!

 

Humm!Hope that my explonation is understandable!

 

Guy

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U and A,

 

If you don't like this method, don't do it. It was not something I do everyday, just a procedure that might be helpful sometime. It saved myself from an overtorque inspection during fire season 2003 where, had I done 2 trips out of the confined area, the second trip would have been with a crew person in a body bag. Not planned, it just happened that I was the closest machine to do the rescue.

 

As for the mountains, whatever works for you is the way to go. My methods have kept me safe in the past 34 years that I have been flying in the Coast Range.

 

By the way, I didn't invent these little tricks that we use in the mountains, I just hear about them, try them out, and do what feels the best for the conditions. This tail rotor trick only works in certain conditions, and if these are not obvious to you, guaranteed you will get into trouble.

 

If you don't agree, this is fine- just go on to the next post.

 

Phil, sorry if I tied up your thread, I will sign off until January. Have a great holiday season.

 

B.M.

B M

I'm not allowed a opinion on here I have to read and go to the next post if I disagree. Thats why this board sucks. I thought someone was looking for information on what to do and not to do in confined areas. Sorry I posted anything. I know why I never post on this board its because if your not on here every day nobody respects you and what you have to say. I almost never sign in when I come on here. I just visit to have a laugh because this board is a joke. It's the attitude of some of the people on here when questions are asked. Thought I could add something to a post. I don't like like that method and will not use it, anyone else who wants to have at it I don't give a rats ###. I was pointing out the problems with the method and the fact that if you need to use it you are outside the performance of the aircraft and maybe you should reconsider and lighten the load and make 2 trips. You don't see it in any flight manuals posted that if you are heavy and may not clear the trees, go to the unloading the tailrotor on take off chart.

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Why wouldn't you be allowed an opinion???

 

Opine away, just no need to shoot everyone with slugs, when simple buck-shot will do!

 

Back to the featured entertainment:

 

In the confined, DON't drift...

 

See my students do this occasionally, looking inside for a quick check, and there we go again.

they need to learn to look inside quickly and STILL get the information needed.

 

Knowing the size of the helicopter is also important. I like to land in an area where I can mark where the skids are, lift off again, and turn 90 degrees, land again across my skid marks. then move forward to land again, putting the tail rotor above the mark just made. This can make the students aware how large the machine is, and what is actually required for size.

 

Also some different checks:

 

WOPPER

Winds Always the most important

Obstacles

Path In

Path out

Emergency planning

Recce Low level (Dummy run) (Funnily enough only used a dummy run once, and got #### from the customer. Landing in the bush by geraldton, in a swamp, with LOTS of chicko's (Dead stumps/trees), and had to reasses the landing site, and marginally heavy.

 

WOTFEEL

Wind

Obstacles

Turbulence

Forced Landing areas

Entry

Exit

Landing area

 

 

As someone mentioned earlier, if there is water, park there, passengers don't like getting wet. NEVER land in a dip, unless this is the only place, and BRIEF and BRIEF and BRIEF the passengers BEFORE you go, for all different scenarios. If in doubt at all, make sure the passengers that depart are going to stay right next to the aircraft until you take off again, this will atleast prevent them from walking UP into the main rotor, or BEHIND into the tail rotor.

 

Scariest moment I EVER had, was at an airport, when the passenger was NOT paying attention to me, or listening to the ground crew and walked behind the machine... Ground crew was as white as me. Passenger was oblivious.

 

Cheers

H.

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I consider that all confined area work is where situational awarness is the most important factor.

Single pilot resource management is where you use everything available to you to successfully acheive the goal. And in confined areas, you need as much help as you can get. I have found that passengers are a great resource and so is the sling mirror. Mentally recording everything you see and repeatedly seeing the problem in your mind can assist your PDM during any manuvering "in the hole". Always leave yourself an out. You can always refuse the job and live another day.

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I consider that all confined area work is where situational awarness is the most important factor.

Single pilot resource management is where you use everything available to you to successfully acheive the goal. And in confined areas, you need as much help as you can get. I have found that passengers are a great resource and so is the sling mirror. Mentally recording everything you see and repeatedly seeing the problem in your mind can assist your PDM during any manuvering "in the hole". Always leave yourself an out. You can always refuse the job and live another day.

 

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I consider that all confined area work is where situational awarness is the most important factor.

Single pilot resource management is where you use everything available to you to successfully acheive the goal. And in confined areas, you need as much help as you can get. I have found that passengers are a great resource and so is the sling mirror. Mentally recording everything you see and repeatedly seeing the problem in your mind can assist your PDM during any manuvering "in the hole". Always leave yourself an out. You can always refuse the job and live another day.

 

 

bottom line is I couldnt agree more , everyone has to know their limits , and not feel pressured by customer or employer to do something they dont feel comfy with . and that would include senior pilots , that they are trying to impress, really guys , we just want you to do the job safe and bring yourself , customer and hopefully the machine back in one piece , KNOW YOUR LIMITS, live by your limits , as time goes on , you will get that feeling of one with the machine , anyone with more than 5000 hours on type will know what I am relating too , with out limits you die ,

 

 

 

 

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This sounds a little like "The Spinning Takeoff." Ken Armstrong wrote about it in his safety article the April/May/June 2004 Helicopters Magazine. It's the last paragraph. HERE.

 

And when it goes bad.. Video.

What the HE** was that? He wasn't even near confined...something else went wrong there.

 

DC

HERE is a link to the accident report. (PDF in spanish)

 

...and a Google Translate translation:

 

REPORT OF AN ACCIDENT.

GENERAL DATA.

Make and Model of the aircraft: Bell-206L4.

Type of operation: Special aerial work

Date and time of accident: May 17 1999, 13:30 UTC, (0830 hl.)

Location of accident: Laguna de Ayllon, Canton Sigsig, Cuenca Azuay Province

Coordinates: S 03 ° 05 '67 "W 078 ° 41 '66"

FACTUAL INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF FLIGHT.

The helicopter was hired to perform evacuation flights and income people and material to an operations center located inside the archaeological Laguna de Ayllon, the operation until the day of the accident lasted seven days during which the helicopter was only able to enter three times.

The helicopter took off carrying a passenger and Gualaceo addressed the Ayllon lagoon to carry two people. After ship these passengers, cargo and baggage started off slightly after the pilot suffered a loss of control and the helicopter crashed into the lagoon.

 

INJURY TO PERSONS.

INJURY CREW PASSENGERS OTHER

Mortals

Graves

1

3

--

Minor / None

 

DAMAGE TO AIRWORTHINESS VE.

Because the helicopter was submerged not verified all the but it appeared that damage had come off one of the rotor blades principal, the tail boom was bent downwards and the lower

fuselage was deformed by the impact and had a hole approximately 80 inches long.

The verification of the existence of other injuries, could not be done, because of the operator after the first inspection and without the knowledge or authorization the Accident Investigation Board dismantled the helicopter.

OTHER DAMAGES

There were no other injuries.

PERSONAL INFORMATION.

The pilot in command of the aircraft was Iranian, Ecuadorian citizen, holder of a license Airline Transport Pilot Helicopter force at the date of the incident. His medical certificate was valid as of the date of the accident and stated as a restriction on use of corrective lenses nearsightedness), while exercise the privileges conferred upon this certificate. This document will enable as a pilot in the helicopter category Mono-multi-class land pilot enabled computer as Bell-206.

On 10 November 1998, the Pilot Aviation Authority submitted to the one request to be granted a license based on his experience in the Force Iranian Air. On 18 December 1998 granted a provisional license for perform updates and check flights.

On 26 January 1999 an authorized Training Center informs the Aviation Authority had made an assessment of the pilot and suggesting that he made a full training given had not flown in

the last four years. Authorization was given for this Center Instruction is who dispenses the training.

On 16 March 1999 the operator of the helicopter informed the Authority that the 7 hours pilot flight served as a team Bell-206-L3 and asks her previous checkup to empowerment, although the Authority approved their training to the Training Center.

On 30 March 1999, he was licensed with the team empowerment Bell296-L3, having done their respective check.

The flight times recorded in March 1999 were certified and counted as a driver and not as a pupil since met with 18 hours of training in order to rehabilitate and get their license.

The month of May 1999 recorded hours of 12 to 16 May were registered no flights have been performed according to the declaration of a pilot of the company.

The only flights that were conducted: as co-pilot on 11 May 1999 at the Route UIO-GUALACEO (04:24 h) as recorded in the log # 2660 and as a pilot commanded the flight on May 17, 1999 en route GUALACEO - Ayllon (00:42 h) as that recorded in the logbook and blogs (day of accident).

Hours flown OVER THE SCAMS UL 07. 30. 60 and 90 days:

7days: 11-May-99 17-May-98: 09:42 H

30 days: 18-Apr-99 17-May-98: 09:42 H

60 days: from 09-Mar-99 17-May-98: 14:24 H

90 days: from 09-Feb-99 17-May-98, 27:42 H

VE AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION.

FUSELAGE

BRAND: BELL.

MODEL: 206-L4

SERIES: 52207

FUSELAGE HOURS: 555.4 since new

ENGINE:

BRAND: ALLISON

MODEL: 250-C30P

SERIES: CAE-895891

ENGINE HOURS: 555.4 since new

Main Rotor:

BRAND: BELL

MODEL: 206-011-1 00-105

SERIES: HB-780

HOURS: 555.4 since new

Tail Rotor:

BRAND: BELL

MODEL: 206-011-100-810-153

SERIES: HB-856

HOURS: 555.4 since new

The aircraft had a Certificate of Provisional Aeronavegabildad effective. The provisional status because they were completing the paperwork to the issuance of final Certificate of Registration.

The maintenance of the aircraft was met under which it establishes manufacturer. In the logs there were no reports of previous failures aircraft that may have contributed to the accident.

The blog # 02,666 for the day of the accident has not signed the pilot in the box "Preflight inspection AIRCRAFT TO LIST.

Weather information.

According to witnesses version of the pilot and weather conditions to time of the accident were good.

Aerodrome information.

The landing area was irregular rock surface was within an area surrounded by mountains and located at 10,500 feet altitude.

INFORMATION ON THE REMAINS OF THE AIRWORTHINESS AND IMPACT EV.

The impact occurred at the center of one of the lagoons 300m from the point take-off, with a nose up attitude backhanded. After first hit the helicopter canopy and stay invested. She slipped one of the main rotor blades and the tail rotor blades suffered a sprain about 60 °.

SURVIVAL.

The pilot and two associates left the helicopter on its own means. The third passenger, who was inside the submerged helicopter was helped staff the camp because of injuries could not drop belt, and I need to receive artificial respiration to recover.

TESTS AND RESEARCH.

The pilot who flew before the event indicated that on May 11, 1999 entered the lagoon for a medical evacuation that day there was no complications for flight, then the prevailing weather conditions in the no gap made it possible, for a period of four days, entering the same, 15

May 1999 resumed the flights, in this attempt led to a loss of pedal control of the helicopter in the lagoon, which was corrected in time by the pilot, which influenced his decision not to continue with flights in view of that in its view the operating conditions in the lagoon were dangerous.

The logs were checked for flights to Lake Ayllon by Pilot injured, determining that the same place as copilot 5 flights as pilot 1, the day of the accident, but after an interview with the pilot who flew above, indicates that what is recorded in logs truth as he put it in the same co-pilot so that the operating company will pay for the days worked in the operation and thus it did remove the dual command of the helicopter after arriving in Gualaceo this was even reported to the Company, meaning that the pilot had the accident never enter the area of operation and the only time I he was the day of the event.

WEIGHT and BALANCE

MTOW 4404.74 LBS.

WEIGHT EMPTY 2439.80 LBS.

PILOT 180.00 LBS

OIL 13.00 lbs

FUEL (over 300 lbs are in Gualaceo) 200.00 LBS

PASSENGERS (180 LBS C / U) x3 540.00 LBS

LOAD 180.00 LBS

TAKE-OFF WEIGHT 3552.80 LBS

All this information is based on documents submitted and statements the pilot.

ANALYSIS.

From the data collected, we can analyze the following:

According to information gathered from documents rest in Section Licenses, the pilot was flying an evaluation team for Bell 206 B part of a Training Center recognized the same as hard 01:12, dated January 26, 1999 concluded in the same as "HIS LAST FLIGHT HELICOPTER IS 4 YEARS AGO, SO IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SHOULD OUE RECEIVE refreshments in the Bell 206 B OUE EOUIPO MAYBE REQUIRED TO MEET THE ENTIRE PROGRAM ASSISTANT Depending on progress CHEOUEO DEMONSTRATED BY PRIOR THE AUTHORITY. "And the flight home as pilot in command did on 17 May 1999, additionally this was his first flight in a system mountain, the Pilot Proficiency was inadequate, given that for make these mountain flights helicopter pilots must make a prior training in order to be enabled on such flights.

In the video filmed the crash can clearly see the loss of control the helicopter experienced in the take off procedure for this we analyze two situations, the first in a possible failure or lockup Control rejecting the same in view of the helicopter starts mind normal takeoff and tour occasionally to the right, the pilot at a time regains control but then the helicopter begins a shift to the left side and again we see that the pilot controls the aircraft to finally fall into the lagoon. The second product the presence of winds at the instant that they come in contact with the main rotor, the wake of this leads to an increase in angle of attack tail rotor, to counter this effect should increase driver pedal reduce the angle of attack of the tail rotor and consequently reduce the thrust to maintain the same rate of turn, as established by the manual flight in its part concerning emergency procedures in the video can see that the helicopter began its ascent, and that at no time pilot can control the shift that performed, ie could not face the wind correctly and consistently in trying to control with the pedals turning action, this was not effective in view of the ascent is required Greater engine power, resulting in the angle of attack of the tail rotor continue to grow and lose all control antitorque it produces.

CONDITIONS OF CALCULATING WEIGHT and BALANCE:

TEMPERATURE: 10 degrees Celsius

PRESSURE ALTITUDE: 10,500 feet

WIND: Variable up to 26 knots.

These operating conditions are applicable to the lagoon, and based on them shall proceed to perform the calculations in the performance tables helicopter, the OUT GROUND EFFECT HOVER CEILING with the parameters following POWER TAKEOFF, ENGINE RPM 100% RPM, GENERATOR 17.5% ANTI-ICE OFF, determining that the conditions previously mentioned temperature, wind and altitude pressure with the weight which could operate the aircraft was 3640 pounds of maximum takeoff weight, according fuel consumption from Gualaceo to the lagoon, the helicopter was within the limits of operation.

The area is called in helicopter flight operations in the mountains as CIRCUS given that it lies within a mountain system, the height at which it operated was 10500 feet, the location of the pond was a sort of plateau on the mountain, inside there was a plane in which landed the helicopter on the day of the accident, weather conditions are very variable in ceiling, visibility, present and especially wind, ground conditions within the lagoon are extremely effects in view of the marshy area is near the gaps, there are few clear that enable a safe landing inside, aid placed to verify the wind did not allow an optimal assessment of same, given that this was a stick with a rag tied and not a windsock.

From the statements made by the other pilot who flew in the area is analyzed that the problem he had on the lake forced him to abandon the operation, Since the considered dangerous, is very similar to what happened in the accident, ie that this pilot was also a total loss of pedal and he managed to recover the same by a rapid stabilization of the helicopter and without But this warning was not taken into account by officers from the airline operating the helicopter.

CONCLUSIONS

The pilot did not have the necessary experience to perform this operation, considering that the only flight that was conducted as a pilot on the accident.

The pilot did not perform properly the procedures established in the Manual Flight of the aircraft.

After calculating the weight of operating performance in the letters is concluded that the weight was within limits.

The area of operation provided the necessary assurances in view of the difficulty of the terrain and weather conditions of the lagoon, additional there were no visual aids for establishing correctly wind conditions.

Despite the warning by the pilot who flew earlier in this area, the company responsible for such work did not make a more minute of the operation in order to determine if indeed the cause of problem that the pilot was subsequently affect the operation.

REASON (S) PROBABLE (S):

The investigating committee believes that the cause was a possible loss of product control flight conditions existing in the area of the Ayllon lagoon.

Contributing factors.

Lack of planning on the helicopter operation in the lagoon of Ayllon.

Lack of experience of the pilot.

Constantly adverse weather conditions and variables.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the airlines to implement the laid down in Article 264 of the Aviation Code in title 12 "Prevention and Investigation accidents "that says," removal or withdrawal of the accident aircraft elements affected and the impact they may have concurred in producing the accident may be practiced only with the permission of the Authority Aeronautics.

Companies before operating in areas where conditions are unknown, first made a study of the characteristics and soil conditions in order to identify unsafe acts and conditions that could occur.

Companies before committing to a pilot operation to ensure the experience, empowering them, especially in mountain work helicopter view of the special conditions representing the operation of an aircraft of this type.

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